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Identity and Federalism:
Understanding the Implications of
Daniels v. Canada
Thomas Isaac and Arend Hoekstra*

“As the curtain opens wider and wider on the history of Canada’s
relationship with its Indigenous peoples, inequities are increasingly
revealed and remedies urgently sought” … “This case represents another
chapter in the pursuit of reconciliation and redress in that relationship”.
With these words Justice Abella set the tone of Daniels v. Canada (Indian
Affairs and Northern Development)1 (“Daniels”); a decision that restates
settled law, reframes core elements of Indigenous identity, and contributes
to the recent resetting of the framework for how the federal and provincial
governments approach reconciliation with Indigenous peoples.
On its face, Daniels is not so much new law, but rather a restatement
of the law which raises more questions requiring further judicial
guidance. The Court declined to make two of the three declarations
requested by the appellants on the grounds that the law was already clear
and settled. The remaining issue, a request for a declaration that nonstatus Indians and Métis peoples were included in the definition of
‘Indian’ for the purposes of section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867,2
was only partially contested, with the Crown (as respondent) conceding
the inclusion of non-status Indians during oral arguments.
In making the requested declaration, the Court may have intended
only to clarify and end the “jurisdictional tug-of-war in which [impacted]
groups were left wondering about where to turn for policy redress”,3
*
Thomas Isaac is a Partner at Cassels Brock & Blackwell LLP, focusing on Aboriginal law.
Arend Hoekstra is a lawyer with Cassels Brock & Blackwell LLP focusing on Government, Aboriginal
and Mining Law.
1
[2016] S.C.J. No. 12, 2016 SCC 12, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 99, at para. 1 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“Daniels”].
2
(U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, Appendix II, No. 5 [hereinafter
“Constitution Act, 1867”].
3
Daniels, supra, note 1, at para. 15.
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however the Court’s approach in doing so has given rise to new questions
about the scope and definition of ‘Indigenous peoples’ and the nature and
purpose of the Crown’s role in reconciliation with Indigenous peoples.
Daniels will significantly impact the practicalities of reconciliation. The
Court dismisses any distinction between status and non-status peoples and,
by implication, raises fundamental questions about Canada’s current
approach to managing its obligations to Aboriginal peoples (including, as
set out in the Indian Act4). Daniels is also further evidence that the Court
no longer prioritizes federal supremacy with regard to section 91(24) and
interactions with Aboriginal peoples. Along with recent jurisprudence in
Grassy Narrows First Nation v. Ontario (Natural Resources)5 (“Grassy
Narrows”), Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia6 (“Tsilhqot’in Nation”)
and Kitkatla Band v. British Columbia (Minister of Small Business,
Tourism and Culture),7 (“Kitkatla”), Daniels makes clear that principles of
federalism and reconciliation require the federal and provincial
governments to act jointly in relation to Indigenous peoples, prompts
questions as to why the federal government replicates provincial-type
services exclusively for Inuit and status ‘Indians’ under the Indian Act and
not for other ‘Indians’ within the meaning of section 91(24), and raises
questions about the appropriate role of provincial governments when
considering the needs and rights of Indigenous peoples.

I. THE DECISION
In Daniels, the Court was asked to make three declarations: (1) “that
Métis and non-status Indians are ‘Indians’ under section 91(24), (2) that
the federal Crown owes a fiduciary duty to Métis and non-status Indians;
and (3) that Métis and non-status Indians have the right to be consulted
and negotiated with, in good faith, by the federal government on a
collective basis through representatives of their choice, respecting all
their rights, interests and needs as Aboriginal peoples”.8
Before considering the first declaration, the Court examined whether
such a declaration would have practical utility in order to “settle a ‘live

4

R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5 [hereinafter “Indian Act”].
[2014] S.C.J. No. 48, 2014 SCC 48, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 447 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Grassy
Narrows”].
6
[2014] S.C.J. No. 44, 2014 SCC 44, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 256 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Tsilhqot’in”].
7
[2002] S.C.J. No. 33, 2002 SCC 31, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 146 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Kitkatla”].
8
Daniels, supra, note 1, at para. 2.
5
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controversy’ between the parties”,9 a criterion in making such a
declaration. Both federal and provincial governments had denied
responsibility for Métis and non-status Indians, leaving the affected
Indigenous groups in a “jurisdictional wasteland with significant and
obvious disadvantaging consequences”.10 The Court found that a
declaration would provide practical utility by allowing certainty for
impacted Indigenous groups, rather than leaving them to “rely more on
noblesse oblige than on what is obliged by the Constitution”.11
Given the Crown’s concession that non-status Indians were subject to
section 91(24), the Court focused its analysis on whether Métis were also
subject to section 91(24). The Court found evidence that ‘Indians’ had
“long been used as a general term referring to all Indigenous peoples,
including mixed ancestry communities”.12 Before and after confederation
the government frequently classified Aboriginal peoples with mixedancestry peoples, and would routinely include Métis communities in
treaties.13 Perhaps most striking, the trial judge found that the Constitution
Act, 1867 was drafted with the intention of constructing a railway across
Canada, and as a consequence, the federal government was given powers to
manage western communities of Aboriginal peoples and Métis and to
address any resistance they might incite against a railway.14
While Métis do not identify as ‘Indians’, they possess distinct cultures,
and are a distinct Aboriginal peoples.15 This does not preclude them from
inclusion under section 91(24). In Reference re: British North America Act,
1867 (U.K.), s. 9116 (“Re Eskimo”) the Court found that “while the Inuit
[similarly] had their own language, culture and identities separate from that
of the ‘Indian Tribes’ ... they were ‘Indians’ under s. 91(24)”.17
Similarly, mixed-ancestry does not preclude such persons from
inclusion within section 91(24), as the Court’s determination in Attorney
General of Canada v. Canard18 “shows that intermarriage and mixed9

Id., at para. 11.
Id., at para. 14.
11
Id., at para. 12.
12
Id., at para. 23.
13
Id., at para. 24.
14
Id., at para. 25.
15
A Matter of National and Constitutional Import: Report of the Minister’s Special
Representative on Reconciliation within Métis: Section 35 Métis Rights and the Manitoba Métis
Federation Decision, at 6, online: <https://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/DAM/DAM-INTER-HQAI/STAGING/texte-text/report_reconciliation_1471371154433_eng.pdf> [hereinafter “Métis MSR”].
16
[1939] S.C.J. No. 5, [1939] S.C.R. 104 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Re Eskimo”].
17
Daniels, supra, note 1, at para. 39.
18
[1975] S.C.J. No. 26, [1976] 1 S.C.R. 170 (S.C.C.).
10
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ancestry do not prelude groups from inclusion under s. 91(24)”.19 To be
clear, while the Court refers to ‘mixed-ancestry’ throughout Daniels, we
know from the Court’s earlier decision in R. v. Powley,20 (“Powley”) and
others, that mixed-ancestry, by itself, is only one attribute of making up
the distinct nature of Métis peoples under section 35.
Despite the lack of “consensus on who is considered Métis or a nonstatus Indian”,21 the Court found that “historical, philosophical, and
linguistic context establish that ‘Indians’ in s. 91(24) includes all
Aboriginal peoples, including non-status Indians and Métis”.22
For the purpose of determining whether a Métis individual is subject
to section 91(24), the Court determined that only the first two parts of the
Powley23 test are relevant, specifically, that: (1) the individual selfidentify as Métis, and (2) they have an ancestral connection to an historic
Métis community.24 The third criterion, that the individual be accepted by
a community, was rejected as it risked excluding those who were no
longer accepted by their community.25
Having concluded that ‘Indian’ in section 91(24) is a broad term
which includes Métis and non-status Indians, the Court noted that
‘Indians’ for the purpose of section 91(24) is different than the use of
‘Indian’ in section 35 of the Constitution Act, 198226 which refers instead
to ‘Indian bands’,27 meaning First Nations.
Having determined that the first declaration should be granted, the
Court considered the second: that the Crown owes a fiduciary duty to
Métis and non-status Indians. The Court identified Delgamuukw v.
British Columbia28 as already defining the fiduciary duty of the Crown,
and Manitoba Métis Federation Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General)29 as
supporting the extension of the fiduciary duty to Métis. As a
consequence, the Court rejected the second declaration on the basis that
it restated settled law.30
19
20

Daniels, supra, note 1, at para. 41.
[2003] S.C.J. No. 43, 2003 SCC 43, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 2007 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter

“Powley”].
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

Daniels, supra, note 1, at para. 17.
Id., at para. 19.
Powley, supra, note 20.
Daniels, supra, note 1, at para. 48.
Id., at para. 49.
Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
Daniels, supra, note 1, at para. 35.
[1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 (S.C.C.).
[2013] S.C.J. No. 14, 2013 SCC 14, [2013] 1 S.C.R. 623 (S.C.C.).
Daniels, supra, note 1, at para. 53.
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The third declaration sought, that Métis and non-status Indians have
the right to be consulted and negotiated with, in good faith, by the federal
government, on a collective basis,31 was also rejected, as it was already
addressed in Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests)32,33
(“Haida Nation”).
1. Findings of the Court
The findings of the Court were not unexpected. While the Court did
not deliberate on the inclusion of non-status Indians in section 91(24) as
it was conceded by Canada, it was nearly certain that the outcome would
reflect the principle of constitutional supremacy. The determination of
‘status’ is governed by the Indian Act, a federal legislative creation
flowing from Parliament’s authority under the Constitution Act, 1867,
and unlikely to govern the interpretation of the Constitution Act, 1867.
With regard to the inclusion of Métis, the Court’s decision was almost
assured given the historical reality of the Métis, the Métis’ inclusion in
some treaties and the judicial precedent of the Inuit being included
within the term ‘Indian’ in Re Eskimo. Though interpreted separately, for
practical purposes the Court was also likely to include in section 91(24)
the same Indigenous peoples listed in section 35; providing the same
rights to Aboriginal peoples, but different methods of obtaining and
practising those rights would have certainly created disparity of
circumstance between Aboriginal peoples, increased the challenge of
reconciliation, created unnecessary redundancies, and made it more
challenging for Aboriginal peoples to exercise their section 35 rights.
The Court was similarly cautious when rejecting the second and third
declarations. Not only were both these declarations unnecessary as they
were addressed by settled law, the declarations were fundamentally related
to section 35 rights rather than section 91(24); any potential conflation of
these constitutional provisions could impact the expectations of Indigenous
peoples (including Aboriginal peoples) and the Crown, potentially
impeding reconciliation.
31
The Court did not specifically address the assertion that there is an obligation to negotiate,
in good faith. Such an assertion was not clearly made in Haida Nation. It will be interesting to see
whether the Court asserts the existence of this duty in the future.
32
[2004] S.C.J. No. 70, 2004 SCC 73, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Haida
Nation”].
33
In Haida Nation, the Court determined that to fulfil the honour of the Crown, the Crown
must consult with, and where appropriate, accommodate Aboriginal peoples whenever Crown action
could adversely impact Aboriginal or treaty rights.
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2. Indigenous Roots
One of the most striking aspects of Daniels is not the conclusion of the
Court, but rather the words the Court employed in reaching its conclusion.
While the Court’s prior use of the term ‘indigenous’ was sparse, Daniels
represents the first material use of the term, core to the central analysis and
reasoning set out in Daniels. The Court used the noun ‘Indigenous’ five
times in Daniels.34 Prior to Daniels, the Court has only used the term
‘indigenous’ in an Aboriginal law context eight other times, and each time
as an adjective (as in ‘indigenous groups’) rather than a proper noun.35
The Court has increasingly used the adjective ‘indigenous’ in recent
years: it was used first in 1973 in Calder v. British Columbia (Attorney
General),36 used sparingly in the 1990s and early 2000s, before being
employed five times in Tsilhqot’in Nation.
The Court’s use of the noun ‘Indigenous’ in Daniels is likely
purposeful. Not only is it used as a proper noun for the first time by the
Court, it is employed from the opening sentence, drawing attention to the
‘inequities’ suffered by Indigenous peoples, and the need for redress.37
(a) What’s in a Name?
The term ‘Indigenous’ in Daniels is used in such diverse settings as to
allow for a general definition to be construed. The Court’s use of
‘Indigenous’ is broad. Three of the five times it is used, ‘Indigenous’ is
prefaced by ‘all’, suggesting that it is intended as a general, rather than a
specific classification. This general category of ‘Indigenous’ peoples
includes First Nations, Inuit, non-status Indians, Métis and what the
Court refers to as ‘mixed-ancestry’ communities:
‘Indians’ has long been used as a general term referring to all Indigenous
peoples, including mixed-ancestry communities like the Métis. The term
34

Daniels, supra, note 1, at paras. 1, 6, 9, 14, 23.
See Mitchell v. Canada (Minister of National Revenue), [2001] S.C.J. No. 33, 2001 SCC
33, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 911 (S.C.C.); R. v. Marshall, [2005] S.C.J. No. 44, 2005 SCC 43, [2005] 2
S.C.R. 220 (S.C.C.); Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia, [2014] S.C.J. No. 44, 2014 SCC 44,
[2014] 2 S.C.R. 256 (S.C.C.); R. v. Côté, [1996] S.C.J. No. 93, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 139 (S.C.C.); R. v.
Van der Peet, [1996] S.C.J. No. 77, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 (S.C.C.); R. v. Kapp, [2008] S.C.J. No. 42,
2008 SCC 41, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 483 (S.C.C.); Calder v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1973]
S.C.J. No. 56, [1973] S.C.R. 313, 34 D.L.R. (3d) 145 (S.C.C.); Manitoba Métis Federation Inc. v.
Canada (Attorney General), [2013] S.C.J. No. 14, 2013 SCC 14, [2013] 1 S.C.R. 623 (S.C.C.).
36
Id.
37
Daniels, supra, note 1, at para. 1.
35
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was created by European settlers and applied to Canada’s Aboriginal
peoples without making any distinction between them.38

In referring to the trial judge’s conclusion, the Court also framed
‘Indigenous’ as including non-status Indians and Métis when it stated
that “‘Indians’ under s. 91(24) is a broad term referring to all Indigenous
peoples in Canada, including non-status Indians and Métis”. While the
Court frames this statement as simply a paraphrasing of the Federal
Court, the trial decision never employed ‘Indigenous’ as a proper noun or
in describing a broader classification of peoples.
Despite these uses, there remains some uncertainty with regard to the
meaning of ‘Indigenous’. The trial judge’s restated determination, above,
would limit ‘Indigenous’ to only section 35 Aboriginal peoples, however
the Court never makes this statement on its own behalf, leaving the door
open to the possibility that ‘Indigenous’ includes other peoples in
addition to those included in section 35. Indeed, the Court’s use of
‘Indigenous’ is entirely expansive: while being clear that ‘Indigenous’
means Indians (including non-status Indians), Métis, Inuit, and ‘mixedancestry’, at no point does the Court limit inclusion in the term.
One potential area for expansion in the scope of the category of
‘Indigenous’ beyond Aboriginal peoples for the purposes of section 35 is
in the definition of Métis. While the Court requires that Métis individuals
subject to section 91(24) meet a modified Powley test, the amended test
has the potential of significantly expanding those defined as Métis for the
purposes of section 91(24) as opposed to section 35.
It is also likely that ‘Indigenous’, as used in Daniels, includes peoples
who consider themselves to be of ‘mixed-ancestry’ or individuals who
have ancestral connections to the communities included in section 91(24)
but who do not identify themselves with any particular community.
Finally, there is a possibility that, as will be discussed later,
‘Indigenous’ is a category which includes not only section 91(24)
peoples, but also encompasses all peoples who have an ancestral
connection to Indigenous communities and even those who, without
definitive evidence, self-identify as ‘Indigenous’.
(b) Purpose of ‘Indigenous’
In addition to uncertainty over the scope of ‘Indigenous’ as a
category, the Court’s purpose in employing the term also remains
38

Id., at para. 23.
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unclear. As will be discussed later, ‘Indigenous’ has a meaning within the
framework of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples39 (“UNDRIP”), potentially leaving the door open to
some form of reconciliation between existing Canadian law and future
implementation of UNDRIP.
The Court may have intended to introduce the term ‘Indigenous’ as a
larger and more flexible category than Aboriginal peoples, which would
encompass all section 91(24) individuals. The Court has traditionally used
‘Aboriginal peoples’ as a synonym for those individuals endowed with
section 35 rights, a definition that is construed from the text of section 35(2)
of the Constitution Act, 1982. With its conclusion in Daniels, the Court
identified a distinct and broader category of Indigenous peoples who are
subject to section 91(24). Since section 91(24) peoples include all
Aboriginal peoples, a definition for section 91(24) peoples would have
naturally worked as a general and broader category to encompass all
constitutionally included peoples. This approach was foiled however, as
section 91(24) already comes with a definition for this larger category:
‘Indian’. The Court’s recognition that ‘Indian’ already has a distinct and
much more narrow definition under section 35 may also be an
acknowledgement that a larger definition is necessary. The Court may have
addressed this problem by employing the noun ‘Indigenous’.
It is also possible that ‘Indigenous’ is indeed broader still,
encompassing both constitutionally included Aboriginal peoples and
others. Such a definition would have a limited legal purpose, but would
be a practical tool of the Court. The categories of peoples included in
section 35 and section 91(24) will necessarily have limits, and at some
point, the Court will need to determine whether someone is or is not
‘Aboriginal’ or ‘Indian’ within the meaning of section 91(24). Using the
term ‘Indigenous’ may be a way of respecting an individual’s or a
community’s identity despite excluding them from constitutionally
defined categories. This potential use of ‘Indigenous’ would be
consistent with the Court’s emphasis on “the pursuit of reconciliation and
redress”40 in the relationship between Canada and its Indigenous peoples,
albeit with a likely consequence of causing greater uncertainty and
confusion, and raising more questions around Indigenous identity and its
meaning from a legal and policy perspective.
39
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: resolution adopted by the
General Assembly, A/RES/61/295, UNGAOR, 61st Sess. (2007), online: United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees <http://www.refworld.org/docid/471355a82.html> [hereinafter “UNDRIP”].
40
Daniels, supra, note 1, at para. 1.
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Finally, the distribution of ‘Indigenous’ throughout Daniels may
provide insights into its intended meaning. ‘Indigenous’ appears
predominantly at the beginning of Daniels, with three-fifths of its
occurrence within the first 16 per cent of the text, four-fifths occurring in
the first quarter of the text, and no instance of ‘Indigenous’ appearing in
the second half of Daniels.41 This distribution suggests that the Court
may not have intended for the term ‘Indigenous’ to be legally significant,
but instead to act as a term of convenience. Once the Court advanced its
discussion and began to examine specific classes of Indigenous peoples
for the purpose of section 91(24) including Métis and non-status Indians,
the Court ceased to use ‘Indigenous’ as a noun or an adjective. The
Court’s restraint from using ‘Indigenous’ within its conclusions and
much of its analysis somewhat undermines the proposition that the Court
intended for ‘Indigenous’ to have a legally significant meaning and
instead lends credence to the proposition that ‘Indigenous’ is used as a
category of convenience. ‘Indigenous’ may not be the only category of
convenience employed by the Court; the Court’s statement that “‘Métis’
can ... be used as a general term for anyone with mixed European and
Aboriginal heritage”, when discussing peoples included in section 91(24),
appears to create an alternative definition of ‘Métis’ that differs from the
Court’s earlier guidance that Métis under section 35 are distinct
Aboriginal peoples not defined solely by their mixed-ancestry.42
The resulting challenge is that without express guidance from the Court,
readers of Daniels are left with a spectrum of alternatives, both to the
meaning of the term ‘Indigenous’, and to the purposes for which the Court
intends ‘Indigenous’ to be used. This is not a particularly helpful proposition
given the dynamic state of Aboriginal relations in Canada today.
(c) Continuing Questions re ‘Indigenous’
With regard to the category ‘Indigenous’, as discussed, Daniels raises
more questions than it addresses. As set out below, the first and
most relevant question for those looking to use the term ‘Indigenous’,
is whether it is intended only to include those peoples subject to
section 91(24) (including, necessarily those peoples subject to section 35),
or whether others may be included? Similarly, does the Court intend for
41
Calculations made on the basis of paragraphs within Daniels. Occurrences of
‘Indigenous’ were at paras. 1, 6, 9, 14, and 23.
42
Métis MSR, supra, note 15, at p. 15.
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‘Indigenous’ to be a legally determinable category, or is it instead
intended as an entirely subjective category whereby anyone can identify
as ‘Indigenous’? Finally, what is the legal purpose of ‘Indigenous’, if
any? Is ‘Indigenous’ only a category of convenience, or does it have
implications within the broader framework of reconciliation and the
honour of the Crown?
3. An All-Inclusive Category
Concerns about the scope of ‘Indigenous’ would become redundant if
section 91(24) itself acted as a broad, wholly encompassing definition
for Indigenous peoples. The Court in Daniels leaves this as a distinct
possibility.
By constricting the Powley test, the Court expands the inclusion of
Métis for the purposes of section 91(24). The test as set out in Powley
and summarized in Daniels “for defining who qualifies as Métis for the
purposes of s. 35(1) [is]:

1. Self-identification as a Métis;
2. An ancestral connection to an historic Métis community; and
3. Acceptance by the modern Métis community.”43
Since section 91(24) is “about the federal government’s relationship
with Canada’s Aboriginal peoples”,44 including “people who may no
longer be accepted by their communities”,45 the Court found that the
third step of the Powley test should be eliminated when concluding on
inclusion as Métis under section 91(24).
On its face, the restriction of the Powley test does appear to only
impact those who are alienated by their community, but Part Three, as set
out in Powley also includes a requirement that “the modern community
[have] continuity with the historic community”.46 The result is to do
away with community-based rights and identity47 and move towards a
framework based solely on ancestral connection (be it by “birth,
adoption, or other means”48). This is a material alteration of the definition
43
44
45
46
47
48

Id., at para. 48.
Id., at para. 49.
Id.
Powley, supra, note 20, at para. 33.
Id., at para. 22.
Id., at para. 32.
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of Métis, not only because it may significantly increase those included in
the category, but also because it may become significantly more difficult to
establish or dismiss claims of inclusion. Finally, though unchanged from
Powley, the availability of ‘other means’ by which ancestry can be
demonstrated, in tandem with eliminating a requirement for continuity with
a historic community, creates the possibility of additional difficult-todisprove claims of Métis identity and the potential for a significant
expansion of the category of Métis. This definition of Métis appears to run
counter to the definition in Powley where it was noted that Métis are not all
mixed-ancestry peoples, but rather peoples who have, in addition to their
mixed ancestry, “developed their own customs, way of life, and
recognizable group identity separate from their Indian or Inuit and
European forebears”,49 and has the potential of materially expanding the
number of individuals included under the term ‘Métis.’
The Court’s inclusion of non-status Indians in section 91(24) was also
determined with what appears to be little concern for the potential
breadth of eligible participants. The Court recognized that the term ‘nonstatus Indian’ was imprecise as it “can refer to Indians who no longer
have status under the Indian Act, or to members of mixed communities
who have never been recognized as Indians by the federal government”.50
The Court’s reference to ‘mixed communities’ suggests that there could
be non-Métis, non-section 35 Indian individuals who are included in
section 91(24). The phrase ‘mixed communities’ rather than ‘mixed
ancestry communities’, may also signify that the Court is less concerned
about cultural or historic elements of Indigenous identity. The Court
expressly states that the term ‘Indians’ as used in section 91(24), has
been associated with “all Indigenous peoples, including mixed-ancestry
communities like the Métis”.51 The Court’s phrasing leads by necessity to
the conclusion that other mixed-ancestry communities who do not
qualify as Métis under the abbreviated Powley test may still fall under
section 91(24).
In setting the scope for section 91(24), the Court appears to show
little concern for imprecise categories, finding that “there is no consensus
on who is considered Métis or a non-status Indian, nor need there be”.52
Again, this appears to contradict, at least for the purposes of section 35,
the Court’s previous findings that Métis peoples are distinct Aboriginal
49
50
51
52

Powley, supra, note 20, at para. 10.
Daniels, supra, note 1, at para. 18.
Id., at para. 23 (emphasis added).
Id., at para. 17.
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peoples with distinct cultures and traditions. Beyond imprecision, the
Court’s actions also appear to embrace general uncertainty; both the
expanded definition of Métis and the flexible approach to determining
Indians for the purposes of section 91(24) are likely to result in scenarios
where proving eligibility is difficult or impossible. Like the use of
‘Indigenous’, the Court does not explain the scope of section 91(24).
(a) What Does it Mean?
Based on the overall tone and structure of Daniels, it is arguable that
the Court has intentionally placed minimal restrictions on the scope of
section 91(24). Since section 91(24) is not a rights-bearing provision, the
Court may perceive it instead to be a practical tool for reconciliation. By
explicitly confirming that section 91(24) does not create a duty to
legislate,53 the Court was left with two potential applications for the
provision: (i) ensuring that the rights of section 35 Aboriginal peoples are
appropriately protected and addressed, and (ii) furthering reconciliation.
The Court’s frequent reference to past injustices, including the operations
and legacy of residential schools,54 may suggest one objective of a broad
definition: ensuring that all individuals harmed by the actions of the Crown
as a consequence of their identity as or their ancestors’ affiliation with
Indigenous peoples can seek redress from the federal government. This
suggestion lends support for the abbreviation of the Powley test and the
inclusion of individuals not otherwise affiliated with an Indigenous
community: while Aboriginal rights are typically held and exercised
collectively,55 Canada’s legacy with Indigenous peoples has often resulted
in harm to individuals.
This broad definition of section 91(24) may therefore serve as an
envelope with which to aggregate all those who seek reconciliation with
the Crown for reasons associated with their Indigenous heritage, without
requiring proof of Aboriginal rights, which may be both impossible and
irrelevant to the objective of redress. Unfortunately, the use of the term
‘Métis’ as referring to both Métis section 35 rights-bearing peoples and
other ‘Métis’ under section 91(24) only adds to the confusion and may
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fundamentally contradict the Court’s earlier findings and reasoning on
why Métis peoples are a distinct Aboriginal peoples in Canada.
4. Future Implications — UNDRIP
The most apparent implication of Daniels, besides providing certainty for
Indigenous peoples, is the importation of the term ‘indigenous’ into
Canadian law. The Court’s increasing use of the term and its prominent
employment in Daniels, during a time when speculation of how Canada will
implement UNDRIP had returned to the news cycle,56 may feed speculation
that the Court is anticipating UNDRIP’s adoption into Canadian law.
UNDRIP was endorsed by Canada in 2010 but has not been ratified
into domestic legislation.57 UNDRIP is a blunt tool not easily connected
to Canada’s existing, sophisticated and rapidly developing section 35
legal framework for recognizing and protecting Aboriginal and treaty
rights. It is not clear how UNDRIP could be incorporated into Canadian
law without significantly altering the existing law relating to Canada’s
Indigenous peoples, as it includes the requirement to obtain “free, prior
and informed consent before adopting and implementing legislative or
administrative measures that may impact [Indigenous peoples]”58 as well
as a stipulation that “indigenous peoples have the right to the lands,
territories and resources which they have traditionally owned, occupied
or otherwise acquired”.59 These broad provisions carry the potential of
significantly altering existing rules around rights recognition and
consultation set out in Haida Nation and Aboriginal title, as recently
discussed in Tsilhqot’in Nation.
The Court’s use of the term ‘Indigenous’ appears to have a
fundamentally different purpose than the use of the word ‘Indigenous’ in
UNDRIP. Daniels employs ‘Indigenous’ as a broad term which is likely
synonymous, or potentially broader than, the category described in
section 91(24). The overall use of ‘Indigenous’ within Daniels appears as
a way of framing both section 35 rights-holding Indigenous peoples and
non-section 35 rights-holding Indigenous peoples. The term ‘Indigenous’
in UNDRIP is used primarily as a way of identifying rights-holders.
56
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In many ways, UNDRIP is inconsistent60 with current Canadian
jurisprudence; to apply UNDRIP to all ‘Indigenous’ peoples would add to
this inconsistency. For example, on its face, the duty to consult under
UNDRIP is broader, though lacking any legal context, than that elucidated
in Haida Nation, and expanded upon in other Court decisions,61 which
provide a spectrum of obligations for consultation, but which, where rights
are unproven, is unlikely to require consent from the impacted Aboriginal
Peoples.62 Similarly, UNDRIP’s stipulation that lands be returned to
Indigenous peoples, with no other material legal context, is inconsistent
with Canada’s relatively sophisticated existing legal framework on these
matters and case law relating to Aboriginal title.63,64
On its face, the term ‘Indigenous’ appears to have been used without
consideration of UNDRIP. If UNDRIP is ever incorporated into
Canadian law, the use of ‘Indigenous’ in Daniels could be applied as a
tool of interpretation, which would likely result in outcomes not
anticipated or intended by the Court or governments.
5. Future Implications — Reconciliation
Perhaps the most interesting implication of Daniels is its meaning for
reconciliation. The Court in Daniels framed its decision around
reconciliation stating that “this case represents another chapter in the
60
‘Inconsistent’ does not in any way suggest that Canadian jurisprudence is deficient or
does not provide material protections to Aboriginal peoples’ constitutionally protected rights from
unilateral state actions, both objectively and in comparison with other nation states that have
Indigenous populations.
61
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pursuit of reconciliation and redress in that relationship”,65 but
interestingly, the ‘reconciliation’, as framed by the Court is between
Canada and its Indigenous peoples.66 Until now, the Court has framed
reconciliation in relation to section 35.67 That framing made sense:
“aboriginals lived on the land in distinct societies, with their own
practices, traditions and cultures”68 before the imposition of the
sovereignty of the Crown. Consequently, in order to respect this prior
existence, the Crown must limit its activities where they would impact
the “practices, traditions and customs central to the Aboriginal societies
that existed in North America prior to contact with Europeans”.69
(a) What is Section 91(24) Reconciliation?
Daniels expands reconciliation beyond its previous focus on section 35
rights. By explicitly expanding section 91(24) beyond the scope of
section 35 rights-holders, the Court has created a category of non-section 35
rights-holders for whom the federal Crown may legislate and infers
potential obligations by stating that the purpose of the declaration is to
provide clarity for section 91(24) peoples looking for redress.70
Reconciliation appears to be different for the purposes of section 91(24)
than for the purposes of section 35. First, section 35 requires a
reconciliation of Aboriginal peoples with the Crown. This reconciliation
recognizes that Aboriginal and treaty rights are held by Aboriginal
communities,71 and that reconciliation involves maintaining a framework
in which separate systems and cultures can co-exist.72 Daniels, however,
expands section 91(24) to include individuals who are not associated with
a community.73 Section 35 reconciliation is not possible between the
Crown and individuals: practically, the Crown cannot accommodate an
indeterminate number of individuals with individually unique rights;
consultation, a hallmark of reconciliation, is not possible as a duty owed to
individuals; and it would be challenging for individuals to assert unique
65
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rights or surrender rights in a meaningful way, particularly given that
section 35 rights are collective in nature.
Second, ‘redress’, as used by the Court in Daniels, does not appear to
refer to Aboriginal rights. Aboriginal rights require reconciliation because
they not only existed, but will continue to exist, conceivable for so long as
the Crown exercises sovereignty. ‘Redress’ alternatively is a backwardslooking noun meaning to seek relief or a remedy.74 ‘Redress’ therefore must
have been triggered by an historic wrong, and must be remediable through
an action in the present. Such wrongs likely include the residential school
system which, as noted previously, the Court refers to repeatedly in Daniels.
Finally, the Court’s use of the term ‘policy redress’75 may distinguish
section 91(24) from the legal redress framework in section 35. ‘Policy
redress’, as compared with legal redress, may imply the desire for
dialogue between Indigenous peoples and the federal government,
sensitive to a spectrum of competing needs and interests, without the
imposition of strict legal obligations on the federal government and
without fettering the ability of provincial governments to govern.
It appears that reconciliation for the purposes of section 91(24) does not
mean a requirement for the Crown to navigate and accommodate new or
existing rights. Not only does the Court’s language not support this assertion,
the inclusion of individuals would make such accommodation
unmanageable. Neither does section 91(24) imply new obligations of the
Crown going forward, for the same reasons. Instead, ‘reconciliation’ for the
purposes of section 91(24) appears to be focused on the federal Crown
remedying historic wrongs that it has committed against Indigenous peoples,
including individuals, whether or not they are section 35 Aboriginal peoples.
(b) What are the Obligations of Section 91(24)?
The focus of section 91(24) may be the reconciliation of individuals
harmed by the Crown as a result of being Indigenous peoples, however
the Crown’s responsibilities with regards to section 91(24) peoples
remain unclear.
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(i) Alternative — Moral Obligation
The Court’s oft reference to residential schools in Daniels suggests
that the Court is concerned with the Crown’s moral obligation to provide
remedies for those who have been injured by its historic acts. Though
Indigenous peoples have the same rights of action against the Crown, it
may be morally objectionable that each should be required to endure the
cost, emotional pain, and time associated with such a claim, especially
given the advanced age of many survivors. Consequently, the declaration of
a moral obligation would be meaningful to affected Indigenous peoples.
It is possible that the Court only intends for section 91(24) to make
clear the moral obligations of the Crown to remedy historic wrongs
against Indigenous peoples, and address their present implications. The
Court cited the observation of the trial judge that Indigenous peoples “are
deprived of programs, services and intangible benefits recognized by all
governments as needed”,76 suggesting that the federal government was
aware of these needs, but avoided moral responsibility by contesting that
jurisdiction was held by the provinces. Since the effects of historic
wrongs are often disparate and broad, and the current implications may
be challenging to address, the Court may recognize that it is not equipped
to evaluate and determine optimal forms of redress and assistance. By
instead making it clear that the federal government is responsible for
addressing historic wrongs and its present implications, the Court
provides clarity on Canada’s moral obligations, and allows the legislature
(being subject to public pressure) to provide meaningful redress and
present implications.
If the intention of section 91(24) ‘redress’ is only to highlight the
Crown’s moral obligations to Indigenous peoples, it is also implied that
the Crown’s obligations to such peoples are limited temporally. Since the
moral obligation is only triggered where the Crown acts in such a way
that requires redress (conceivably on a scale that triggers public moral
concern), the Crown’s obligations to section 91(24) Indigenous peoples
would conclude once reasonable redress was provided. This is not
inconsistent with the Court’s general tone in Daniels: if the purpose is
redress, then it is conceivable that such a purpose could be fulfilled.
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(ii) Alternative — General Obligation
Instead of asserting only a moral obligation, the Court could be
suggesting that while historic wrongs resulted in the need for redress,
such redress should be focused on addressing inequality instead of
specific harm. Inequality and specific harm may be connected, having
been the result of the same misconduct, but a focus on general inequality
rather than specific redress will have drastically different consequences.
The Court has noted, as previously identified, that some Indigenous
peoples “are deprived of programs, services and intangible benefits”.77
This language is significantly broader than ‘redress’, used elsewhere, and
seems inconsistent with some aspects of Daniels. For instance, it is
unclear how additional programming and services could effectively
target those not associated with an Indigenous community. Similarly,
how can an obligation to address inequality survive the Court’s assertion
that there is no “duty to legislate”?78
More significantly, if the objective of section 91(24) goes beyond
specific and individual redress, and instead considers broader more fluid
concepts like inequality, the obligations on the federal government
may continue indefinitely. Though not unreasonable given the
intergenerational legacy of Canada’s historic misdeeds towards
Indigenous peoples,79 a broader obligation on the Crown to address
systemic inequality would likely require significant and ongoing efforts
which in practice may be consistent with the Crown’s existing practices
with Aboriginal peoples.
Reconciliation that focused on the general well-being of Indigenous
peoples would, necessarily, be less focused on individual harm
committed, which sits in contrast to the Courts concern for individuals
who are disassociated from their traditional communities and who have
fallen through the cracks. Addressing economic disparity would require a
focus on education and economic empowerment, activities which may
benefit Indigenous communities, but which would likely omit
disassociated Indigenous peoples. Such a result does not seem consistent
with the purposes and perspectives applied in Daniels.
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(c) Conclusions on Reconciliation
While the Court in Daniels refers to reconciliation, it does not
explicitly state what section 91(24) reconciliation comprises and what
obligations the Crown has in furthering section 91(24) reconciliation.
The Court’s stated aim of clarifying where Indigenous peoples should
turn for redress is countered by its assertion that the federal government
does not have an obligation to legislate. The resulting stalemate suggests
that given the complexity of section 91(24), partially created by the
broad scope for inclusion of individuals therein, the Court has no
intention to dictate the appropriate framework for redress and
reconciliation. Rather, it appears that the Court has clarified the
obligations of the federal government and will allow the political process
to find a resolution, at least for now.
While it may be possible that the Court intends for section 91(24) to
address broader inequalities, this is not supported by the text in Daniels.
While calls for greater funding are a natural outcome of Daniels and would
be helpful for reconciliation generally, the Court’s desired approach seems
to be more nuanced given its concern for Indigenous peoples who are
otherwise unaffiliated with existing Indigenous communities.
6. Provinces, Aboriginal Peoples and Federalism
During a conference in late 2016, one of the authors overheard a
provincial representative state that the Canadian provinces were the
‘winners’ in Daniels. Such views of ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ as between the
provinces and the federal government represent an impoverished view
of section 35, reconciliation, the honour of the Crown, and more
fundamentally, the legal underpinnings of the Canadian federation.
Following the release of Daniels, many argued that funding for Métis
communities was likely to increase, with one representative commentator
noting that “the federal government will [now] have to justify any
distinction in the type and level of services it provides to status Indians,
non-status Indians and Métis”.80 This position is not unreasonable.
Pursuant to the Indian Act, the federal government has maintained a
register of First Nations people who qualify as status Indians. Despite
lacking a foundation in section 35, this register has been a primary factor
80
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in determining federal funding allocations. At present, status Indians
have turned to the federal government for education and healthcare
programs, while non-status and Métis have instead been served, in
varying degrees and in some cases with uncertainty, by the provinces.
In Daniels, the Court exposed this dichotomy of treatment between
status Indians and other Aboriginal peoples as constitutionally unfounded.
If, as Daniels asserts, section 91(24) includes all Indians, Inuit and Métis,
why has the federal government, when acting pursuant to the authority
granted to it in section 91(24), distinguished between section 35 Aboriginal
peoples when deciding whether to provide services and other support?
On its face, Daniels suggests that the federal government will need to
justify any disparity in the allocation of funding and benefits between
status Indians and other section 35 rights holders.81 Given that the federal
government currently provides provincial-type services to status Indians
and Inuit, some have interpreted Daniels to mean that the federal
government must now take over the provision of services to all Indigenous
peoples. However, this interpretation relies on an assumption about the
federal government’s obligations to Indigenous peoples which is not
supported by Daniels.
(a) Declaration Federal and Provincial Governments’ Obligations
Come From Section 35, not Section 91(24)
The federal government’s obligations to Aboriginal peoples are set
out in section 35. Section 35 extends to all Aboriginal peoples meeting
the test for possessing such rights (as set out in Van der Peet and
Powley82), whether status or non-status, as well as to Inuit and Métis
peoples. However, these section 35 obligations are not exclusive to the
federal governments as section 35 “applies to both provinces and the
federal government”.83
The nature of the relationship between the federal government and
Indigenous peoples is distinguished from the relationship between the
provinces and Indigenous peoples by reason only of section 91(24).
However, section 91(24) does not create obligations to Indigenous
peoples in the way that section 35 creates obligations on the Crown to
81
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Aboriginal peoples. Section 91(24) has an altogether different purpose.
Since it contains no duty to legislate,84 section 91(24) is not a source of
rights for Indigenous peoples, and instead “is about the federal
government’s relationship with Canada’s Aboriginal peoples”.85 As
suggested earlier, the nature of any obligation which flows to the federal
government as a consequence of section 91(24) is unclear, and may be
focused on a moral duty in lieu of a legislative duty.
(b) Section 91(24) does not Significantly Constrain the Provinces
From Acting
In Daniels, the Court explicitly stated that “federal authority under
section 91(24) does not bar valid provincial schemes that do not impair
the core of the Indian power”86 and that it will “favour, where possible,
the ordinary operation of statutes enacted by both levels of government”.87
As the Court in Kitkatla noted, “provincial laws can apply to
aboriginal peoples; First Nations are not enclaves of federal power in a
sea of provincial jurisdiction”.88 Even where provincial heads of power
like education or healthcare can be shown to be section 35 rights, that
should not preclude provinces from legislating, given the Court’s
statement in Tsilhqot’in Nation that “provincial regulation of general
application will apply to exercises of Aboriginal rights ... subject to the
s. 35 infringement and justification framework”.89
(c) The Federal Government is Using Section 91(24) to Perform
Provincial Obligations
Given that the provinces are able to operate legislative schemes of
general application which may impact Indigenous peoples, Daniels does
more than draw attention to the federal government’s practice of
providing disparate levels of resources services to different Indigenous
peoples. Daniels raises the question, why does the federal government
run a parallel scheme of services including education and healthcare for
any Indigenous peoples?
84
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Beyond the general obligations in section 91(24), there is no explicit
requirement for the federal government to provide education or
healthcare to Aboriginal peoples or Indigenous peoples.90 The provision
of education is included as a provincial power under section 93 of the
Constitution Act, 1867. Similarly, provinces also have broad and
extensive powers over the provision of healthcare.91
Why then does the federal government provide provincial-type services
to some Indigenous peoples? At one time, the federal government’s policy of
providing provincial-level services was doubtlessly due to section 91(24)
and the “watertight compartments”92 view of federalism. But the landscape
of federalism has changed over the years as a result of a “strong pull of pith
and substance, the aspect doctrine and, in recent years, a very restrained
approach to concurrency and paramountcy issues”.93
The federal government does not have an obligation to provide
services like health care and education. Social services fall to the very
heart of provincial powers; they are quintessentially local maters, often
involving local property.
Without the obligation to provide provincial-type services to
Indigenous peoples, Daniels presents Canada with a dilemma: should the
federal government expand the provincial-type services it offers to all
Indigenous peoples at significant cost, or should it abandon its provision
of provincial-level services and use funding instead for other issues
which are more central to Indigenous rights and reconciliation?
(d) Daniels Makes Clear the Provinces’ Obligations to Indigenous
Peoples
If section 91(24) does not compel the federal government to legislate
and does not exclude the provinces from enacting legislation, why then
90
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would provinces expect that Métis and non-status Indians should turn to the
federal government for these services? Additionally, what constitutional
reason compels the federal government to provide these services?
The earlier suggestion that the provinces ‘won’ Daniels was
misconstrued. Daniels suggests that Canadian provinces cannot hide
behind section 91(24) as a basis for not providing equal services and care
to all citizens of their respective provinces. Any views suggesting that
the federal government is solely responsible for providing what would
otherwise be provincial services is inconsistent with the growing
jurisprudence regarding provincial and federal rights and obligations
towards Aboriginal and Indigenous peoples.
Beyond its constitutional foundation, the Court’s approach also has
immensely practical value. Provinces are best placed to provide local
services like education and healthcare since, in many places, they
provide them locally already, are more sensitive to local markets and
needs, and as a result of their close proximity, may be more likely to
respond to local concerns and developments. In many instances, the
federal government’s continuing involvement in these local matters risks
increasing local disparity between Indigenous peoples and Canadians.
(e) A Framework for Reconciliation
Although not expressly stated, it appears that the Court is setting up a
system whereby the federal government can deal with broader matters
associated with reconciliation with Indigenous peoples, but without
interfering with provincial authority and responsibility for their citizens,
including those who are Indigenous. Of course, the anomaly to this
practical approach is the reality of the federal Indian Act and the
provision of what normally would be provincial services (e.g., health
care, education) to First Nations and reserve-based governments. The
stage may be set for a much-needed dialogue as among the federal
government, the provinces and Indigenous peoples about which level of
government should be providing core services and which level of
government should be focused on broader objectives of redress and
reconciliation with Indigenous peoples in Canada.
The Court has laid out a pathway to reconciliation in Kitkatla, Grassy
Narrows and Tsilhqot’in Nation, among others, which increasingly sees
Canadian provinces acting within their full capacity, constrained not by
section 91(24), but instead by the rights and principles founded on
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section 35. Despite suggestions that more money will need to be spent on
Indigenous peoples following Daniels,94 the actual result could be the
opposite. From a practical perspective, the federal government may be
reticent to dramatically expand spending on Indigenous peoples,
especially when the full number of potentially eligible persons remains
unknown. Even without the evolution in federalism, existing funding
would most likely be reallocated from First Nations and Inuit peoples to
Métis and other Indigenous peoples.
The emphasis on reconciliation and redress within Daniels illuminates
the core of the federal government’s obligation towards Aboriginal and
Indigenous peoples. Reconciliation involves negotiating treaties, and
ensuring compliance thereunder. For Indigenous peoples living on reserves,
reconciliation means developing structures that allow reserve communities
to exercise their Aboriginal and treaty rights and protect the interests of
future generations. For Indigenous peoples generally, reconciliation means
providing redress for the historic misdeeds that Canada has committed
against them as a result of their affiliation with, or identification as,
Indigenous peoples and looking forward to ensure Indigenous peoples’
interests and those of Canada more generally are properly reconciled.

II. CONCLUSION
Daniels may end up being one of the most important Aboriginal law
decisions, not because of the declaration that the Court makes, or those
that it chose not to, but because of the insights it provides into the
understanding of reconciliation. Reconciliation goes beyond just
protecting section 35 rights. It also includes a larger concept of redress
for those mistreated as a consequence of being Indigenous peoples.
Many historic practices of the federal government are not consistent with
section 35 or section 91(24) and are unnecessary, and potentially
incompatible, with reconciliation.
Daniels lays bare the unfounded historical legacy of the federal
government’s approach to providing essentially local services to a
discrete group of Canadians: status Indian and Inuit peoples. Federalism
and section 91(24) have evolved and developed towards the allencompassing objective of reconciliation. Indigenous peoples are no
94
Joanna Smith, “Supreme Court Recognizes Rights of Métis and Non-Status Indians”, The
Toronto Star (14 April 2016), online: <https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2016/04/14/supremecourt-recognizes-rights-of-mtis-and-non-status-indians.html>.

(2017) 81 S.C.L.R. (2d)

IDENTITY AND FEDERALISM

51

longer an ‘enclave’ of the federal government. They are Canadians and
provincial residents. The rights of Aboriginal peoples do not come from
inclusion under section 91(24), or from inclusion under the Indian Act,
but rather are based on section 35, and are, as stated in Tsilqhot’in
Nation, “a limit on both federal and provincial jurisdiction”.95
Daniels stands as more evidence that federalism has evolved: it
includes both the federal and provincial governments working within
their constitutionally mandated powers to respect, and where permitted
infringe, section 35 rights. In light of this evolution, Daniels could be the
slight noise that triggers an avalanche of change, clearing away the
historic practices and confines of the Indian Act in favour of a fresh,
broad and simpler approach focused on reconciliation.
As such, Daniels may represent the ultimate opportunity for Canada
as a nation to recalibrate its relationship with Indigenous peoples and
ensure that all levels of government are undertaking their appropriate
roles to ensure that Indigenous Canadians are treated fairly and equitably,
as are other Canadians, by both provincial governments and the federal
government. Obviously, this is a significant challenge, but one that needs
to be addressed head-on if the ultimate objective of reconciliation is to
be achieved.
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